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Introduction 
 
Virtually every government provides distributive transfers for electoral purposes. 
However, the level and form of such transfers vary dramatically across countries. Cross-national 
variation in the level of (re)distributive transfers has generated significant research (e.g. Alesina, 
Glaeser, Sacerdote, 2001; Bawn and Rosenbluth, 2006; Iversen and Soskice, 2006; Lizzeri and 
Persico, 2001; Milesi-Ferreti, Rostagno and Perotti, 2001; Persson and Tabellini, 1999, 2000, 
2003). Variation in transfer form has received relatively less scholarly attention.  
Distributive transfers provide particularistic benefits to select groups (Collie, 1988). In 
practice, these groups may be more or less select. Broadly targeted transfers provide benefits to 
large groups of individuals who share general attributes. Examples of broad transfers include 
unemployment benefits made available to all persons regardless of their occupation or previous 
industry of employment and pensions available to all persons of a certain age (Verdier, 1995). In 
contrast, narrowly targeted transfers provide benefits only to very select segments of the 
electorate. For example, industry-specific subsidies benefit only those voters whose assets (land, 
labor, or capital) are employed in the privileged industry. Although distributive transfers take 
many forms, they can generally be characterized as being either broad or narrow.  
Governments’ portfolios of distributive policies typically include both broad and narrow 
transfers. However, it is frequently the case that one type of transfer tends to be privileged over 
the other. For example, the United Kingdom’s portfolio of distributive policies during the late 
1960s and early 1970s consisted primarily of narrow transfers. During this period, politicians 
implemented policies whose explicit objectives were to provide select benefits to narrow groups, 
such as individual industries and firms (Sharp and Shepherd, 1987). In contrast, Germany’s 
portfolio of distributive policies consisted almost exclusively of broad transfers during this 
Strategic targeting 2 
 
 
 
period. Transfers were generally made available to all industries in the manufacturing sector 
rather than a select few (Shepherd and Duchene, 1983). In fact, German governments routinely 
refused to provide transfers to individual firms or industries during this period (Schatz and 
Wolter, 1987). Instead, politicians focused on building a comprehensive framework of broadly 
targeted distributive transfers, called the Soziale Marktwirtschaft (Sharp and Shepherd, 1987).  
 Cross-national differences in transfer form persist today despite increased economic 
integration and restrictions on certain types of transfers embodied in international agreements 
like the World Trade Organization and the European Union. How can the variation in the form of 
distributive transfers across countries be explained?  
The form of distributive transfers in a given country is influenced by both domestic 
institutions and domestic interests. Two sets of interests are of critical importance for transfer 
form: the economic interests of voters and the political interests of office holders and office 
seekers. Politicians prefer the transfer type with the greatest electoral benefits. The electoral 
benefits politicians gain from providing either broad or narrow transfers depend critically on 
voters’ preferences over transfer form and the country’s electoral rules. Voters prefer the transfer 
type that maximizes their income. The electoral rules shape the nature of electoral competition 
and identify those voters whose preferences matter the most for politicians’ reelection chances. 
Taken together, electoral institutions and domestic interests shape the form of distributive 
transfers.  
Examining the joint effect of domestic interests and institutions on the form distributive 
transfers makes several important contributions to our understanding of the politics of 
(re)distribution. First, it provides a new empirical test of an important hypothesis proposed in the 
literature, namely that electoral rules affect the form of distributive transfers. Although this 
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hypothesis has received considerable scholarly attention to date, it has been subjected to few 
empirical tests because of the difficulty of measuring transfer form. Second, this research 
introduces domestic interests to existing institutional explanations of transfer form. Domestic 
interests have been frequently overlooked in studies of the cross-national variance in transfer 
form (e.g. Lizzeri and Persico, 2001; Persson and Tabellini, 1999). Ignoring domestic interests 
may be relatively innocuous if politicians elected via different rules are equally responsive to 
voters’ demands for various types of distributive transfers. If politicians elected via a particular 
set of rules are more responsive to voters’ preferences over transfer form, overlooking voter 
demand may lead to inaccurate conclusions about the causal mechanism linking electoral rules to 
transfer form and inaccurate predictions of the effect of electoral rules. In short, taking 
institutions and interests together provides a more complete and accurate understanding of the 
provision of different types of transfers by electorally minded parties and politicians. 
Existing explanations 
 A large and sophisticated literature points to the importance of electoral institutions for 
transfer form (e.g. Lizzeri and Persico, 2001; Milesi-Ferreti, Rostagno and Perotti, 2001; Persson 
and Tabellini, 1999, 2000, 2003). In these studies, politicians (and parties) are generally assumed 
to be office-seeking. To maximize their chances of reelection, politicians work to target 
distributive transfers to those voters most critical to their reelection chances. The identity of 
these voters is determined by the country’s electoral rules. For example, the voters most critical 
to a politician’s reelection chances in a plurality-rule, single-member district system are those in 
the politician’s geographically-defined electoral district. Under plurality electoral rules, 
politicians are assumed to need 50 percent plus one of the votes to win reelection. To secure this 
outcome, politicians’ optimal strategy is to provide transfers targeted to only those voters in their 
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electoral districts (Persson and Tabellini, 1999, 2000, 2003). This is also true for parties 
competing in two-party plurality rule systems with single-member districts.  
Majoritarian electoral rules tend to be closely associated with single-member electoral 
districts. This empirical regularity provides further incentives for electorally minded politicians 
(and parties) in majoritarian systems to provide narrow transfers. Single member districts tend to 
be smaller than multimember districts (Powell and Vanberg, 2000). The influence of narrow, 
particularistic groups is greater in smaller districts (Alt and Gilligan, 1994; Magee, Brock and 
Young, 1989; Mansfield and Busch, 1995; Rogowski, 1997). McGillivray (2004: 28) provides 
the following illustrative example: An industry with 100 employees represents 10 percent of the 
electorate in a district with 1,000 voters. The same industry represents only 0.1 percent of the 
electorate in a district of 100,000 voters. In the larger district, refusing to provide targeted 
benefits to the industry is unlikely to affect the politician’s reelection chances because the 
industry is only 0.1 percent of the representative’s electorate. As a result, the smaller electoral 
districts (both in terms of seats and size) typically found in majoritarian systems provide 
politicians with additional electoral incentives to target benefits to narrow segments of the 
electorate. 
In proportional systems, politicians and parties are believed to have fewer electoral 
incentives to supply narrow transfers (Lizzeri and Persico, 2001; Persson and Tabellini, 2003; 
Rogowski, 1987, 1997). Parties competing under proportional electoral rules do not win elections 
district by district. As such, no single district is critical to the electoral success of a party 
(McGillivray, 2004). Instead, parties work to maximize their aggregate vote share because this 
determines the number of legislative seats the party will control. By targeting transfers to a broad 
segment of the electorate, parties are able to “buy” the electoral support of a wide range of voters 
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dispersed across electoral districts. This is precisely the type of electoral support that is most 
beneficial to parties competing in multi-member districts under proportional rule. 
To illustrate this, consider the following example. If a country has an unemployment rate 
of 10 percent, a party could potentially secure 10 percent of the national vote share by promising 
increased unemployment benefits. However, such a transfer might buy 3 percent of the vote 
share in one district and 30 percent in another, depending on the pattern of unemployment. This 
cross-district disparity does not matter to parties competing in proportional (PR) systems. 
However, for parties in two-party, plurality systems it is wasteful to buy votes this way. They 
will massively overbuy in some districts obtaining much more than the necessary 50 percent plus 
one votes needed to win under plurality electoral rules.   
In sum, existing research on the form of distributive transfers focuses primarily on the 
importance of electoral rules. The general expectation derived from much of this research is that 
majoritarian systems will have more narrow transfers than PR systems. Although empirical tests 
of this expectation are limited because of the dearth of cross-nationally comparable measures of 
transfer form, the evidence that does exist is mixed. For example, Persson and Tabellini (2003) 
find that PR systems spend relatively more on broad transfers, measured by government 
spending on social security and welfare spending as a percentage of GDP. In contrast, Rogowski 
and Kayser (2002), and Rogowski, Chang, and Kayser (2005) find evidence to suggest that PR 
systems provide relatively more narrow transfers. They find that proportional electoral systems 
are associated with higher levels of consumer prices. Higher consumer prices may reflect narrow 
transfers delivered to particular groups, such as individual industries (Bawn and Rosenbluth 
2006, 262).  
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Simple two-country comparisons are also ambiguous. For example, the United Kingdom 
and Belgium both targeted approximately 50 percent of their manufacturing transfers to 
individual industries during the 1990s, according to the Commission of the European 
Communities’ Survey on State Aid (2002), despite the fact that they have dissimilar electoral 
institutions. Furthermore, the amount spent on narrow transfers relative to broad has changed 
over time in the United Kingdom although the country’s electoral rules have remained constant 
(Commission of the European Communities’ Survey on State Aid, 2002). The pattern of 
distributive transfers across countries and over time suggests that electoral institutions alone 
cannot fully explain the observed variation in transfer form. Domestic interests must also be 
taken into consideration.  
Argument 
Domestic interests and electoral institutions shape the form of distributive transfers. 
Politicians interested in maximizing their chances of (re)election work to provide the type of 
transfer with the greatest electoral benefits. The electoral benefits of different types of transfers 
are jointly determined by the country’s electoral rules and voters’ preferences over transfer form. 
Voters prefer the type of transfer that maximizes their income. The type of transfer that 
maximizes voters’ income depends critically on their mobility. Voters that find it prohibitively 
costly to move to a new group prefer transfers that target benefits only to their current group. The 
optimal transfer for ‘immobile’ voters would provide benefits to their group up to the point 
where marginal benefit equals the group’s share of marginal cost and no benefits at all to any 
other group (Bawn and Rosenbluth, 2006: 253). Voters able to move freely between groups are 
relatively less interested in narrowly targeted transfers.  In short, voters’ preferences over 
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transfer form depend critically on their mobility and more precisely the mobility of their income 
earning assets.  
Mobility, particularly with respect to factors of production such as land, labor, and 
capital, plays a critical role in theories of trade politics (e.g. Hiscox, 2002; Jones, 1971: 
O’Rourke and Sinnott, 2001; Rogowski, 1989; Stolper and Samuelson, 1941). Indeed, factor 
mobility is regarded as crucial for understanding the political-economic origins of a wide range 
of trade and industrial policies, since the economic interests of asset owners are shaped by their 
ability to shift assets between uses (Grossman and Levinsohn, 1989). Factor mobility reflects the 
costs of moving assets, such as land, labor or capital, between uses in the domestic economy. 
These costs are often referred to as adjustment costs. I focus here on the adjustment costs facing 
workers because in most countries, the median voter earns the majority of their income from 
labor rather than land or capital assets (Kono, 2007; Mayer, 1984).i The costs of adjustment 
facing workers include the search costs involved in finding a new job, the costs of re-training, the 
potential obsolescence of their skills, and the loss of rents specific to their current job.  
Workers’ preferences over transfer form vary systematically with the adjustment costs 
they face (Alt et al., 1996; Verdier, 1995; Zahariadis, 2001). Workers facing high adjustment 
costs prefer narrowly targeted transfers. The current and future incomes of workers stuck in their 
current industry because of prohibitively high adjustment costs are tied directly to the profits of 
the industry (or firm) in which they currently work. If the fortunes of that industry decline, 
workers unable to leave because of high adjustment costs receive lower rates of return. Given 
this, workers facing high adjustment costs are particularly concerned with protecting the returns 
in the industry in which they are currently employed.   
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Although both broad and narrow transfers could, in theory, serve to insulate industry 
returns from market pressures, narrow transfers are preferred to broad transfers because they 
maximize the incomes of immobile (specific) workers. The rents generated by narrow transfers 
are shared among fewer people than those from broad transfers. As such, the per-person benefits 
of narrow transfers are greater than the per-person benefits of broad transfers (Alt and Gilligan, 
1994: 182). Furthermore, these benefits tend not to be arbitrated away by new entrants because 
of the high barriers to entry that exist in industries characterized by specific workers (Frieden, 
1991). Workers employed in other industries need to invest resources to obtain the skills required 
to enter the privileged industry. If the rents are high enough, workers may be willing to make 
such an investment. However, acquiring such skills takes time. In the short term, the skills 
required for employment in industries characterized by specific labor prevents workers from 
rushing into the industry to take advantage of industry-specific rents.  
Narrowly targeted transfers are less beneficial to mobile workers. Narrow transfers, such 
as industry-specific subsidies and/or trade protections, benefit only those workers currently 
employed in the privileged industry. If workers move out of that industry to take a new job, they 
loose the benefits of the narrow transfer, which instead becomes a pure tax. Given this, the 
expected benefits of narrow transfers are discounted by voters that are able to move out of a 
given industry with relative ease.ii Mobile workers prefer broad programs that allocate benefits to 
large segments of the labor market without reference to industry or occupation. Such programs 
allow workers to continue to enjoy the benefits even after moving to a new industry.  
The preferences of individual workers’ over transfer form vary with the adjustment costs 
they face. Does this individual-level variation produce systematic variation across countries? 
There are several reasons to expect so. First, workers in a given country face a set of common 
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adjustment costs. These common costs stem from country-specific characteristics, such as the 
level of industrialization and the regulatory barriers to occupational and geographic relocation 
imposed by federal and local governments (Edin and Zetterberg, 1992; Fung and Staiger, 1996; 
Hiscox and Burgoon, 2000; Krueger and Summers, 1987; Parsons, 1972). For example, early 
stages of industrialization often bring major innovations in transportation that lower the cost of 
labor movement and diminish the importance of geography to the economy (Hiscox, 2002). This 
is evident even in small countries such as Belgium where the extension of the rail network in the 
late 1800s dramatically increased labor movement between regions and sectors (Huberman, 
2004). Technological innovations in methods of production also have important implications for 
country-specific adjustment costs. The introduction of labor-saving technology and production 
line technology increases the ease with which workers can shift between manufacturing 
industries (Sokoloff, 1986). These technological innovations also increase the demand for 
unskilled workers thereby lowering the costs of moving into the industrial sector from other 
sectors of the economy, like agriculture. Later stages of industrialization, often characterized by 
moves from assembly-line to continuous-process technology and dramatic technological 
advances in robotics, required more skilled workers thereby increasing the costs of adjustment 
(Hiscox, 2002).iii  
Some portion of the total adjustment costs facing any given worker is common to all 
workers in that country, regardless of their individual characteristics. It is these common 
adjustment costs vary cross-nationally and can explain in part the incentives for politicians to 
provide one type of distributive transfer rather than another. Politicians are more willing to 
supply a particular type of transfer where there is greater voter demand for it.  
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Like Bailey (2001), Broz (2005), and others, I assume that voters need not organize for 
their economic interests to shape policy outcomes. This is because rival politicians have 
incentives to activate latent interests if elected representatives pay too little attention to them 
(Arnold, 1992; Bailey, 2001; Denzau and Munger, 1986). Rational legislators forestall such 
attacks by serving these voters preemptively. As a result, voters need not mobilize, organize or 
unionize for their economic interests to shape the form of distributive transfers.iv Politicians 
calculate the distributional effects of different transfer types on the voting constituencies within 
their districts. They then work to provide the type of transfers that reflect these interests, even in 
the absence of direct voter influence, organization or lobbying. 
However, voters’ economic interests are only one factor that determines the electoral 
benefits of providing narrowly targeted transfers. Electoral institutions also matter. The primary 
causal mechanism linking electoral rules and transfer form in previous research is electoral 
competition, as discussed above. There is, however, another causal mechanism through which 
electoral institutions may influence transfer form that has gone largely unnoticed due to the lack 
of attention to voters’ interests, namely responsiveness. Politicians elected via different rules 
may vary in their responsiveness to voters’ preferences. For example, Powell and Vanberg 
(2000) argue that politicians in PR systems are more responsive to voters’ preferences than 
voters in majoritarian systems. They demonstrate that a closer correspondence exists between the 
median voter’s preferences and those of the median legislator in PR systems (Powell and 
Vanberg, 2000). One explanation for this may be that the position of the median voter is more 
closely represented by a party in multi-party PR systems, as demonstrated by Cox (1990). If 
politicians in PR systems are more responsive to voters’ preferences, increased demand for 
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narrow transfers should result in relatively larger increases in the number of narrow transfers in 
PR systems, as compared to majoritarian systems.  
In addition to being more responsive, politicians in PR systems may also be better able to 
provide narrow transfers in response to surges in voter demand for these types of transfers. One 
reason for this may be that PR systems tend to have more veto players than majoritarian systems 
(Cox and McCubbins, 2001). If each veto player is interested in passing a narrow transfer for a 
different constituency, the chances of success for any given demand may be quite high as each 
player promises support for others’ narrow transfers in return for support for their own (Cox and 
McCubbins, 2001). The higher frequency of multi-party coalitions in PR systems may also 
increase the ability of politicians to respond to surges in demand for narrow transfers. Previous 
research demonstrates that multi-party coalitions behave differently than single-party coalitions, 
even when the same interests are represented (Bawn and Rosenbluth, 2006). While single-party 
governments are held accountable for all of their policy decisions (Cox, 1990), parties in a multi-
party coalition governments are less accountable given the difficulty of assigning blame to any 
single party in a coalition government. Multi-party governments are likely able to provide many 
more narrow transfers than single-party governments because although the costs of providing 
many narrow transfers may be detrimental to the country as a whole, each party in a coalition 
government can shirk responsibility for these costs.v  
Because politicians elected via proportional rules tend to be relatively more responsive to 
voters’ preferences and may be better able to supply narrow transfers, I expect increased voter 
demand for narrow transfers to have a relatively larger effect on the number of narrow transfers 
in PR countries, holding all else constant. As voter demand for narrow transfers grows, the 
number of narrow transfers should increase in both PR and majoritarian countries. However, the 
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increase should be relatively larger in PR countries, all else equal. I test this expectation using 
two new measures of narrow transfers discussed in the following section.  
Empirical measures 
Empirical research on transfer form has been limited due to the dearth of cross-nationally 
comparable measures. Generating comparable measures of transfer form is difficult given the 
myriad of distributive policies including subsidies, regulations, taxes, and trade policies. An ideal 
measure of narrow transfers would estimate the total amount of all such transfers provided by 
any type of policy. However, such a measure has proven virtually impossible to construct (Bawn 
and Rosenbluth, 2006; Duchene and Shepherd, 1987; McGillivray, 2004; Meny and Wright, 
1986). In an attempt to overcome this limitation, Rogowski and Kayser (2002) use national price 
levels to estimate aggregate economic distortions caused by distributive policies. Similarly, 
McGillivray (2004) uses industry stock prices in an attempt to measure industry protection. One 
advantage of these measures is that they arguably capture the different types of targeted 
transfers. However, these measures also capture many other factors that have nothing to do with 
(re)distribution or transfer form , such as transportation costs and market size (McGillivray, 
2004; Rodrigez and Rodrik, 2000). 
Measuring only one kind of narrow transfer has proven no easier. For example, cross-
national comparisons of industry subsidies are believed to be suspect even where the bases seem 
to relate to the same categories of expenditures (Duchene and Shepherd, 1987). Furthermore, 
government expenditures on subsidies generally do not convey the focused impact of selective 
measures, which is the concept of interest here.  
Given these difficulties, it is no surprise then that existing measures of narrow transfers 
are rather rudimentary. Milesi-Ferretti et al. (2002), for example, estimate government spending 
Strategic targeting 13 
 
 
 
on narrowly targeted transfers using the sum of social security payments and other transfers to 
families, plus subsidies to firms. Persson and Tabellini (2003) operationalize targeted transfers as 
government spending on pensions and unemployment insurance payments. Both measures have 
serious drawbacks. The first conflates more narrowly targeted transfers with broader transfers. 
The second closely approximates the operational definition of broad (rather than narrow) 
transfers used here. The limitations of these and other existing measures illustrate the difficulty 
of estimating the frequency and generosity of narrowly targeted transfers in a cross-nationally 
comparable manner.vi    
In an attempt to overcome these measurement limitations, I use two novel measures of 
narrow transfers made possible by international monitoring of domestic transfers. International 
agreements, like the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the World Trade Organization, 
and the European Union limit the ways in which national governments can target distribution. 
For example, rules negotiated as part of the GATT/WTO restrict the provision of narrow 
transfers to select segments of a country’s economy. As early as the Tokyo Round of 1979, the 
use of narrowly targeted subsidies by national governments was restricted by Articles VI, XVI 
and XXIII.  Since then, international restrictions on narrow domestic transfers have been 
significantly strengthened, clarified, and expanded. For example, The WTO Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (Articles 1 through 9) explicitly bans government 
subsidies targeted exclusively to individual industries or firms in the manufacturing sector.  
Despite these restrictions, some governments choose to provide narrow transfers in 
violation of their international treaty obligations.vii The provision of illegal narrow transfers is 
monitored by international producers. Narrow transfers provided to a single industry in one 
country increase the competitiveness of that industry’s products on the international market. 
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Producers facing this increased competition will sound a “fire alarm” in their respective country 
(McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984) lobbying their home government to take action at the 
international level. Such action can take one of two forms. First, extra duties (i.e. countervailing 
duties) can be imposed against illegally subsidized products. Second, formal complaints can be 
filed with the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Body. Complaints may seek both the withdrawal 
of the illegal narrow transfer and compensation for its adverse effects. 
Countervailing duties (CVDs) and complaints filed over narrow transfers are used here to 
estimate the relative frequency of narrowly targeted transfers in defendant countries.viii Arguably, 
countries facing more CVDs and complaints have more narrow transfers. Of course, there are 
many factors which influence the circumstances under which countries choose to impose CVDs 
or file complaints (Allee, 2005; Reinhardt, 2000). Given this, it is unlikely that every instance of 
narrow transfers is captured by these measures. However, there is no reason to believe that this 
cuts in favor of the argument made here. In fact, the non-random noise contained in these 
measures of narrow transfers likely makes it more difficult to find support for my argument. 
Although the vast majority of all complaints filed with the GATT/WTO have at issue a 
narrowly targeted transfer (80 percent during the period from 1980-1994; 66 percent during 
1995-2003), I systematically code and exclude complaints filed over other issues to increase the 
validity of this measure. Details on the coding criteria and exclusion decisions are reported in 
Appendix A.  
Measuring voters’ preferences over transfer form is equally difficult. Voters facing high 
adjustment costs prefer narrow transfers, as argued above. To estimate the common adjustment 
costs facing workers in a given country, I measure the dispersion in wages across industries by 
calculating the coefficient of variation for wage rates across manufacturing industries.ix Data are 
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from Freeman and Oostendorp’s Occupational Wages around the World (OWW) Database. 
These data benefit from an improved version of Freeman and Oostendorp’s (2002) 
standardization procedure, which includes country-specific data correction factors.x  
The dispersion in wages across industries (inter-industry wage differentials) is a 
commonly used and widely accepted measure of labor specificity (e.g. Dickens and Katz, 1987; 
Edin and Zetterberg, 1992; Gibbons and Katz, 1992; Hiscox, 2002; Katz and Summers, 1989; 
Krueger and Summers, 1987). This measure is favored because it closely approximates the 
theoretical concept of interest (the elasticity of substitution), which is not itself directly 
observable (Hiscox, 2002). The assumption is that when adjustment costs are low, wage 
differentials should be arbitraged away by the movement of workers between industries. 
Workers have incentives to move between industries in order to maximize their income. They do 
so only when the costs of adjustment are not prohibitively high. The movement of workers 
between industries (or even just the potential for it) should equalize returns to similar types of 
workers across industries.xi High inter-industry wage differentials are therefore taken as evidence 
of high adjustment costs.  
Although inter-industry wage differentials are widely used to estimate labor specificity, 
there are reasons to exercise caution when using this measure. Most fundamentally, some part of 
inter-industry wage differentials may reflect heterogeneity in labor skill levels rather than actual 
adjustment costs. To minimize this possibility, I calculate wage differentials using only those 
industries employing workers with similar skill levels. Specifically, I calculate the coefficient of 
variation for wage rates across the 15 manufacturing industries characterized by Wood (1994) as 
being average or low skill industries. Doing so maximizes my sample size and minimizes sample 
selection bias. It also reduces the heterogeneity of workers’ skills thereby minimizing the effect 
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of skill variation on inter-industry wage differentials. Eliminating high-skill industries may have 
the unintended consequence of excluding those workers facing the highest adjustment costs (if 
skills are positively correlated with adjustment costs). Excluding high-skill industries likely 
makes it more difficult to find evidence in support of my argument because those workers with 
the greatest interest in narrow transfers are missing from the sample.xii  
Empirical model 
 Two sets of models are estimated using different dependent variables. The first, 
Complaints, measures the total number of complaints filed with the GATT/WTO against a 
country alleging the provision of a narrow transfer in a given year. The second, CVDs, measures 
the total number of countervailing duties imposed against a given country in a given year. Given 
the discrete non-negative properties of both variables, it is appropriate to use an event count 
procedure to model the process. Here, I use the negative binominal model because both count 
variables are overdispersed.xiii The negative binomial model allows for overdispersion and 
includes parameters for unobserved variance in the number of disputes across countries (King, 
1989; Long, 1997).  
One might argue that the zero inflated negative binomial model is more appropriate for 
this analysis given the excessive number of zeroes in both count variables.xiv However, the large 
number of zeros may be the result of unobserved heterogeneity (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998; 
Long, 1997). Unobserved heterogeneity can cause both overdispersion and an increase in the 
proportion of zeros. The negative binominal model can account for the ovedispersion and the 
excess zeros in the raw data. The negative binominal model responds to the under prediction of 
zeros in the Poisson regression model by increasing the conditional variance without changing 
the conditional mean (Long, 1997). In contrast, zero modified count models change the mean 
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structure to explicitly model the production of zero counts. This is done by assuming that zeros 
can be generated by a different process than positive counts. However, the theory advanced here 
does not suggest that the zeros are generated by a different process. Given this, it is difficult to 
justify theoretically the use of the zero inflated negative binomial model. I do, however, test to 
see if estimating a zero-inflated negative binominal model would produce dramatically different 
results.xv No significant bias appears to be introduced by estimating the more theoretically sound 
negative binominal model rather than the zero-inflated model. 
The base sample is an unbalanced panel with yearly observations from 1980 to 2003. 
These data are used in a pooled time-series cross-section analysis with country-years as 
observations. Countries are included only during those years in which they are GATT/WTO 
members and only high-functioning democracies are included in the sample.xvi This allows for 
correct estimates of the effect of electoral rules and minimizes the cross-national variance in the 
costs of non-compliance with GATT/WTO restrictions on narrowly targeted transfers 
(Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff, 2002). All reported models are estimated using robust 
standard errors clustered by country. These standard errors adjust for the fact that observations 
for each country are unlikely to be independent. The failure to account for clustering may 
understate the standard errors on the estimated coefficients for the country-level variables 
(Moulton, 1990). All models include a lagged dependent variable to take account of serial 
correlation.xvii  
The base model includes several important control variables.xviii Previous research 
suggests that some complaints are filed in retaliation for previous complaints (Busch and 
Reinhardt, 2002). To account for this, a dichotomous variable labeled Plaintiff indicates those 
country-years in which a complaint or CVD was filed by the country. The WTO regime differs 
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from the GATT regime in several important ways. Therefore, an indicator variable, WTO (coded 
one for years during the WTO regime and zero otherwise) is included in all estimated models.  
Countries with majoritarian electoral rules tend to have relatively larger economies. It 
may be possible to find a spurious positive correlation between majoritarian electoral rules and 
illegal narrow transfers if large countries are less concerned with the international costs of non-
compliance. In order to correctly estimate the effect of majoritarian electoral rules on targeted 
transfers and minimize the cross-national variance in the costs of non-compliance, the log of 
GDP is included to control for a country’s size.  
Several additional economic variables are also included.xix Exports, calculated as the 
amount of goods and services exported as a percent of GDP (logged), is included because 
international scrutiny of a country’s domestic transfers increases as a country’s exports increase. 
GDP per capita is included because developed countries have historically used the GATT/WTO 
dispute settlement procedures more often than less-developed countries. Also, the costs of non-
compliance may vary systematically with economic development making it important to control 
for development.  
The yearly rate of economic growth (Growth) is included because slower economic 
growth may spur demands for narrow transfers in an attempt to insulate the rates of return in a 
particular industry from market pressures. Economic growth may also capture indirectly the 
effect of various economic shocks. To test for this, I include separately two different measures of 
external shocks to traded sectors of the economy: import growth and terms of trade. One might 
expect greater demand for narrow transfers in countries facing increased import competition or 
deteriorating terms of trade.xx Additionally, violating international restrictions during times of 
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adverse economic conditions may not entail the same reputation costs as doing so under normal 
economic conditions (Drazen, 1997).  
Although these control variables are not unrelated, standard tests show acceptable levels 
of multicolinearity.xxi Their inclusion in a single model does not introduce undue bias. The 
results are reported in Table 1 and described below. 
[Table 1 about here] 
Results 
Adjustment costs, measured by inter-industry wage differentials, are positively associated 
with narrow transfers, as expected. Increased adjustment costs increase the expected number of 
narrow transfers in both majoritarian and PR systems. However, the increase is relatively larger 
in PR systems as demonstrated in Table 2, which reports the percentage increase in the expected 
number of narrow transfers.xxii As adjustment costs increase from the 10th percentile to the 25th 
percentile, the expected number of Complaints increases by 17 percent in majoritarian countries 
in a given year and 100 percent in PR countries. Although politicians in both systems are 
responsive to increased demand for narrow transfers (spurred by higher adjustment costs), 
politicians in PR systems are relatively more responsive. The difference in responsiveness across 
the two systems is even greater at higher levels of labor specificity. As adjustment costs increase 
from the 75th to the 90th percentile, the expected number of Complaints increases by 60 percent 
in majoritarian systems in a given year; the increase is greater than 900 percent in PR systems. 
Although politicians elected via majoritarian rules are not deaf to increased voter demand for 
narrow transfers, politicians in PR systems appear to be far more responsive, all else equal.   
[Table 2 about here] 
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Given this, it may be possible that under certain circumstances PR systems will provide 
more narrow transfers than majoritarian systems. When voter demand for narrow transfers is 
very high, for example, one might expect to see more narrow transfers in PR countries. I find 
some evidence of this in Table 3, which reports the expected number of narrow transfers in PR 
and majoritarian countries across various levels of labor specificity.xxiii When adjustment costs 
are quite high (90th percentile), there are more narrow transfers in PR countries than majoritarian 
countries, all else equal.xxiv This is arguably because politicians in PR systems are more 
responsive to surges in voter demand for narrow transfers and better able to supply narrow 
transfers than politicians in majoritarian systems.  
[Table 3 about here] 
In general, however, majoritarian systems tend to be more prone to narrow transfers than 
PR systems. Moving from a PR system to a majoritarian system increases the expected number 
of narrow transfers (Complaints) by 288 percent in a given year, holding all else constant.xxv  
When adjustment costs fall below the 90th percentile, the expected number of narrow transfers is 
greater in majoritarian systems. This finding is consistent with arguments by Persson and 
Tabellini (1999, 2000, 2003), Lizzeri and Persico (2001) and others and points to the potential 
independent effect of electoral rules on transfer form. The incentives to provide narrow transfers 
appear to exist in majoritarian countries even when there is little voter demand for such transfers. 
For example, when adjustment costs fall in the 10th percentile, majoritarian systems continue to 
provide more narrow transfers than PR systems. This is arguably because the voters critical to a 
politician’s (and a party’s) electoral success in majoritarian systems are concentrated in select, 
geographically-defined electoral districts. Electorally minded politicians competing for office in 
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these systems have incentives to provide narrow transfers to these voters in the hope that they 
will reward them with their electoral support.  
Although electoral rules play an important role in shaping the form of distributive 
transfers, they are only one determinant. Voters’ demands also matter. Greater voter demand for 
narrowly targeted transfers increases the number of narrow transfers in any given country. 
However, the increase is relatively larger in PR countries. Although majoritarian systems are 
generally more prone to narrow transfers, PR systems are more responsive to surges in demand 
for narrow transfers. This finding is remarkably robust; introducing other possible variables of 
interest such as the relative strength of industry unions or external shocks does not change the 
key findings.xxvi Furthermore, I find similar results using an alternative measure of voter demand 
for narrow transfers, namely the rate of labor movement.xxvii These results are also strikingly 
similar across the two measures of narrow transfers, although only statistically significant at 
conventional levels when narrow transfers are measured using Complaints. The similarities 
between the models estimated using Complaints and CVDs are rather surprising given the large 
substantive differences between the processes and politics surrounding countervailing duties and 
GATT/WTO complaints. Future research using new measures of narrowly targeted transfers is 
needed to confirm the generalizability of these results. Given the difficultly of measuring 
narrowly targeted transfers in a cross-nationally comparable manner, these findings represent an 
important first step to understanding the interactive effect of electoral institutions and domestic 
interests on the form of distributive transfers.  
Conclusion 
Virtually every government provides distributive transfers for electoral purposes. 
However, the level and form of such transfers vary dramatically across countries. In some 
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countries, distributive transfers tend to target benefits to broadly defined groups of voters. In 
others, the benefits of distributive transfers often go exclusively to narrow select groups. What 
explains the cross-national variation in transfer form? The answer proposed here points to the 
importance of domestic politics. Together, electoral institutions and domestic economic interests 
shape the form of distributive transfers and explain, in part, the variation in transfer form across 
countries.  
Politicians seeking to maximize their (re)election chances work to provide the type of 
transfer with the greatest electoral benefits. The electoral benefits of different types of transfers 
are determined in part by the country’s electoral rules. Narrow transfers provide relatively 
greater benefits to politicians in majoritarian systems because of the nature of electoral 
competition in these systems. However, electorally minded politicians in both systems respond to 
voters’ preferences over transfer form. Voters’ preferences over the form of distributive transfers 
are determined by the costs of moving their primary income earning asset (most often labor) 
between uses in the domestic economy. As the costs of adjustment increase, voter demand for 
narrow transfers grows. As demand grows, the number of narrow transfers increases in both PR 
and majoritarian systems. However, the rate of increase is relatively greater in PR systems 
suggesting that politicians elected via proportional rules are relatively more responsive to voter 
demand.  
This finding suggests a possible resolution to the debate over which electoral system is 
most prone to narrow transfers and may help to explain previous mixed results. Although 
Persson and Tabellini (2003) find that PR systems spend relatively more on broad transfers, 
Rogowski and Kayser (2002), and Rogowski, Chang, and Kayser (2003) find evidence to suggest 
that PR systems provide relatively more narrow transfers. The argument made here suggests that 
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both outcomes are possible depending on voters’ preferences over transfer form. In general, 
majoritarian systems tend to provided more narrow transfers than PR systems. However, PR 
systems are more responsive to surges in voter demand for narrow transfers. When voter demand 
for narrow transfers is high, PR systems may provide more narrow transfers than majoritarian 
systems because they are relatively more responsive to voter demand and better able to supply 
narrow transfers.  
In Rogowski’s studies, the countries in question are all economically developed. In fact, 
Rogowski’s analyses include only OECD countries while Persson and Tabellini examine as 
many as 80 countries with various levels of economic development. The difference in samples 
has important implications for voter’s preferences over transfer form. In developed economies, 
the adjustment costs facing workers tend to be quite high (Hiscox, 2002). As a result, voter 
demand for narrow transfers is likely high in Rogowski’s sample of countries. When voter 
demand for narrow transfers is high, we might reasonably expect to see more narrow transfers in 
PR countries because of the closer correspondence between the interests of the voters and the 
legislators in PR systems and because politicians in PR systems may be better able to supply 
narrow transfers in response to voter demand. In short, Rogowski et al.’s findings are fully 
consistent with the argument made here – an argument which may help to resolve the debate 
over which electoral system is most prone to narrow transfers and further our understanding of 
the politics of (re)distribution.  
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Table 1: Negative binominal model of narrow transfers 
 
 Complaints CVDs 
 1 2 3 1.1 2.1 3.1 
Domestic politics       
L.Majoritarian 1.464 1.486 5.218 0.779 0.811 1.661 
 (0.815)* (0.763)* (1.093)*** (0.614) (0.603) (0.860)*** 
L.Adjustment costs  0.046 0.195  0.01 0.049 
  (0.011)*** (0.027)***  (0.011) (0.039) 
L.Maj*L.Adjustment costs   -0.157   -0.046 
   (0.030)***   (0.041) 
International politics       
L.Plaintiff 0.061 -0.035 -0.063 0.437 0.348 0.296 
 (0.307) (0.244) (0.23) (0.939) (0.934) (0.926) 
WTO regime 0.582 0.688 0.483 0.521 0.514 0.325 
 (0.364) (0.352)* (0.35) (0.377) (0.391) (0.326) 
Economics       
L.Exports (nlog) -0.116 0.032 0.364 0.206 0.262 0.422 
 (0.618) (0.429) (0.415) (0.567) (0.567) (0.523) 
L.Growth (nlog) 0.424 0.398 0.443 -0.165 -0.166 -0.145 
 (0.201)** (0.197)** (0.178)** (0.187) (0.186) (0.17) 
L.GDP (nlog) 0.445 0.41 0.595 0.161 0.157 0.242 
 (0.159)*** (0.148)*** (0.167)*** (0.193) (0.188) (0.226) 
L.GDP per capita (nlog) 0.345 0.793 0.726 -0.199 -0.112 -0.158 
 (0.229) (0.263)*** (0.261)*** (0.29) (0.29) (0.286) 
       
L.Dependent variable 0.365 0.32 0.299 0.75 0.757 0.77 
 (0.186)** (0.128)** (0.118)** (0.167)*** (0.166)*** (0.167)*** 
Constant -19.08 -23.85 -32.78 -5.75 -6.86 -9.83 
 (4.78)*** (3.93)*** (3.86)*** (4.34) (4.38) (5.79)* 
Alpha 0.09 0 0 1.25 1.2 1.14 
 (0.06) (0) (0) (0.93) (0.94) (0.8) 
Observations 317 317 317 318 318 318 
# of Countries 39 39 39 39 39 39 
McFadden's R-squared 0.31 0.33 0.37 0.11 0.12 0.13 
 
Notes: Estimated using a negative binominal model. Robust standard errors clustered by country 
are reported in parentheses. *** significant at the 0.01 level in a two-tailed test, ** significant at 
the 0.05 level in a two-tailed test , * significant at the 0.1 level in a two-tailed test. 
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Table 2: Percentage increase in the expected number of narrow transfers  
 
 E[Complaints] E[CVDs] 
Adjustment costs Majoritarian PR Majoritarian PR 
10 → 25 percentile  17**  100** 1 19 
25 → 50 percentile 26** 175** 2.2 32 
50 → 75 percentile 39** 418** 2.8 63 
75  → 90 percentile 60** 905** 6.2 140 
 
Notes: Estimated via CLARIFY using Models 3 and 3.1 from Table 1 (King, Tomz and 
Wittenberg, 2000; Tomz, Wittenberg and King, 2001). All control variables are held constant at 
their median values. The interaction term along with both constitutive terms (L.Majoritarian and 
L.Adjustment costs) were modified for each simulation. ** indicates that the increase is 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level 
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Table 3: Expected number of narrow transfers  
 
 E[Complaints] E[CVDs] 
Adjustment costs Majoritarian PR Majoritarian PR 
10 percentile (7.4) .075 
(.042) 
.002 
(.001) 
.137 
(.073) 
.036 
(.021) 
25 percentile (11.9) .088 
(.047) 
.004 
(.003) 
.138 
(.073) 
.043 
(.019) 
50 percentile (18.2) .111 
(.057) 
.011 
(.007) 
.141 
(.074) 
.057 
(.022) 
75 percentile (26.8) .155 
(.079) 
.057 
(.03) 
.145 
(.081) 
.093 
(.052) 
90 percentile (38.6) .248 
(.137) 
.573 
(.323) 
.154 
(.096) 
.224 
(.273) 
 
Notes: Estimated via CLARIFY using Models 3 and 3.1 from Table 1 (King, Tomz and 
Wittenberg 2000; Tomz, Wittenberg and King 2001). All control variables are held constant at 
their median values. The interaction term along with both constitutive terms (L.Majoritarian and 
L.Adjustment costs) were modified for each simulation. So, for example, L.Majoritarian was set 
equal to 1, L.Adjustment costs was set equal to 11.9, and the interaction term 
(L.Maj*L.Adjustment costs) was set equal to 11.9 to estimate the expected number of narrow 
transfers in countries with majoritarian electoral rules and adjustment costs equal to 11.9 (25th 
percentile). Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
 
Strategic targeting 36 
 
 
 
Appendix A: Details of the construction of Complaints variable 
Complaints measures the cumulative number of complaints filed against a GATT/WTO 
member country alleging the existence of an illegal narrow transfer in a given year. I 
systematically identify and exclude those complaints that were not filed in response to alleged 
illegal narrow transfers including: (1) complaints over broad transfers and/or policies that affect 
a wide range of goods, producers, or industries. So for example, the 1982 dispute between the 
United States and the European Community over the value added tax (VAT) threshold is 
excluded; (2) complaints related to the enforcement of intellectual property rights; (3) complaints 
filed against the European Community/European Union unless it is quite clear which EC/EU 
member country the complaint is primarily in response to; (4) complaints related to anti-dumping 
measures. Anti-dumping measures are imposed by governments in response to a foreign firm’s 
policy rather than a foreign government’s policy; (5) complaints that are explicitly political in 
nature. So, for example, the 1985 complaint filed by Nicaragua against the US in response to the 
trade embargo imposed by the Reagan Administration is excluded; (6) complaints related to non-
manufacturing transfers in order to ensure consistency with the countervailing duties measure 
and the measure of inter-industry wage differentials. Complaints over countervailing duties are 
included only after carefully examining the GATT/WTO Panel Reports to correctly identify the 
country initially accused of having the illegal narrow transfer. Complaints filed by multiple 
countries over a single illegal narrow transfer are counted against the defendant country only 
once. A research assistant independently coded the universe of GATT/WTO complaints using 
the same criteria. The percentage agreement between the two coders was 99%. 
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Notes 
                                                 
i
 Focusing on the adjustment costs facing labor has several other advantages. First, labor is 
relatively immobile across national borders (Rodrik, 2000). This allows us to ignore the 
possibility that the preferences of internationally immobile workers differ from those of 
internationally mobile workers (Hiscox, 2004). Second, the adjustment costs facing labor have 
received significant scholarly attention and consensus exists as to how to estimate these costs.    
ii
 It is important to note that this argument is different from, but wholly consistent with, Estevez-
Abe, Iversen, and Soskice (2001) who argue that broad transfers induce workers to invest in 
specific skills. Once workers have these specific skills they then demand narrow transfers.  
iii
 Institutional complementarities may reinforce cross-national variation in adjustment costs. In 
countries with high adjustment costs, institutions develop that make use of the industry-specific 
skills available in the labor market (Hall and Soskice, 2001). 
iv
 Unions may help to increase the probability that the demands of certain groups of voters are 
translated into policy outcomes. With respect to transfer form, the role of unions would likely 
depend on the characteristics of unions’ members. Industry unions are more likely to push for 
narrow transfers than nationally centralized unions representing workers from different 
industries. Unfortunately, due to data limitations it is not possible to test this expectation for the 
entire sample of countries under investigation here.  
v
 Some argue that aggregate government spending is higher with multi-party coalition 
government because of this dynamic (e.g. Bawn and Rosenbluth, 2006; Persson, Roland and 
Tabellini, 2003). Given this, it may be the case that PR systems spend more than majoritarian 
systems on both narrow and broad transfers.  
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vi
 Additional attempts to measure narrow transfers include civilian spending (Swank, 1988) and 
overall government expenditures as a percentage of GDP (Bawn and Rosenbluth, 2006). Neither 
measure closely approximates the concept of interest here. 
vii
 They may do so because of the domestic electoral benefits.  
viii
 Data are from the Allee (2005); Hudec (1993); Reinhardt (1996); and the WTO (2005).  
ix
 I also employ a second measure of adjustment costs as a robustness test. This measure, 
estimates the rate of labor movement across manufacturing industries and into and out of the 
manufacturing sector (Seddon and Wacziarg, 2001). Using this alternative measure, I find 
strikingly similar results. Higher adjustment costs increase the number of narrow transfers in any 
given country; the increase is relatively larger in PR countries. These results are available from 
the author upon request. 
x
 See Oostendorp (2005) for more details. 
xi
 This is a simple application of the “law of one price.” 
xii
 To test for this possibility, I re-estimate all models using a measure of inter-industry wage 
differentials calculated for all manufacturing industries, regardless of skill-type. I find similar 
results to those found using only average/low skill industries. These are available upon request.  
xiii
 The mean of CVD is equal to 0.12; the standard deviation is 0.42. The mean value of 
Complaints is 0.17; the standard deviation is 0.55. Although the unconditional variance is greater 
than the unconditional mean for both count variables, the dispersion parameter, alpha, is equal to 
zero in several of the estimated models. When alpha is equal to zero, the negative binominal 
distribution is equivalent to a Poisson distribution.  
xiv
 88 percent of the sample country-years have no Complaints and 91 percent have no CVDs. 
xv
 I use a country’s exports to predict zero counts.  
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xvi
 Only countries with a Polity score greater than 5 are included in the sample. Data are from 
Marshall and Jaggers (2003).  
xvii
 Although including the lagged dependent variable is arguably ‘most correct’, I re-estimated 
all models without the lagged dependent variable to see what, if any, temporal dynamics may 
have been obscured by the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable. The coefficients on the 
key variables of interest are virtually unchanged. This is likely because most of the variation in 
the key variables of interest (Majoritarian and Adjustment Costs) is cross-sectional. For example, 
no country in my sample changes their electoral rules during the period under study. 
xviii
 All control variables are lagged one year to take into account the delay between the 
implementation of an illegal narrow transfer and the international reaction. I experimented with 
different lag structures and did not find any significant difference for the key variables of interest 
(Majoritarian and Adjustment Costs), arguably because these variables tend to be relatively time 
invariant making the specific lag structure less important.   
xix
 Data on all economic variables come from the World Development Indicators (2005).  
xx
 Neither measure is a robust predictor of narrow transfers. For this reason and space 
constraints, models that include Import Growth and Terms of Trade are not reported here but are 
available from the author upon request. Importantly, the estimated coefficient on the key 
variables of interest did not change significantly when these measures were included.  
xxi
 The variance inflation factor (VIF) is less than 4 for all variables included in the models, as 
recommended by Huber et al. (1993). 
xxii
 Estimated via CLARIFY using Models 3 and 3.1 from Table 1 (King, Tomz and Wittenberg, 
2000; Tomz, Wittenberg and King, 2001). All control variables are held constant at their median 
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values. The interaction term along with both constitutive terms (L.Majoritarian and L.Adjustment 
costs) were modified for each simulation.  
xxiii
 In every case, the expected number of narrow transfers is quite small. This is because the 
modal number of transfers in any given country-year is zero. However, this does not mean that 
the substantive effect of voter preferences and electoral institutions is small. It simply 
demonstrates that the likelihood of seeing a Complaint or CVD in any given year in any given 
country is relatively low. 
xxiv
 This difference is not statistically significant at conventional levels.  
xxv
 This effect is estimated via Clarify using Model 2 from Table 1. All other variables are held 
constant at their median value. This effect is statistically significant at the 0.1 level in a two-
tailed test.  
xxvi
 Although these results are not reported here, they are available from the author upon request. 
The relative strength of industry unions is measured for developed countries using data from 
Golden, Lange, and Wallerstein (2006). Specifically, I calculate the ratio of unaffiliated union 
membership to confederal union membership. I measure external shocks using the percentage 
change in imports and the net barter terms of trade (WDI, 2007). These variables are not 
statistically significant at conventional levels.  
xxvii
 Specifically, I use Wacziarg and Wallack (2004)’s EM2 measure that calculates the overall 
manufacturing employment loss or gain as the percentage change in total manufacturing 
employment for the past two years. Higher rates of labor movement are taken as indicators of 
lower adjustment costs. These results are available from the author upon request.  
